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The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux
On Same-Sex Marriage, the Supreme Court’s Opinion in United States v. Windsor, John
Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty (1859), and H.L.A. Hart’s Modern Harm Principle
Bernard E. Harcourt 1
Introduction
In an article published in 1999, titled ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle,’ 2 I argued that
the harm principle, originally articulated in John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty (1859), had
collapsed under the weight of its own success and no longer serves, today, as a limiting principle
on the legal enforcement of morality. The widely-perceived triumph of the harm principle over
legal moralism, I argued, produced a proliferation of harm arguments across the political
spectrum, including among proponents of legal enforcement; given that the harm principle is a
limiting principle and does not contain a criterion to evaluate non-trivial harms, nor to adjudicate
between competing claims of non-trivial harms, the hegemonic success of the harm principle and
the resulting proliferation of harm arguments effectively eviscerated the ability of the harm
principle to limit the legal regulation and punishment of morality.
Several commentators raised forceful questions about the relationship between Mill’s
essay and the harm principle, as well as about the continuing vitality of Mill’s argument in On
Liberty. 3 In this article, I return to my original argument to draw an important distinction and to
clarify a central point.
First, the distinction: Although Mill first articulated, in the ‘Introductory’ to On Liberty, a
simple harm principle focused on the basic notion of ‘harm to others,’ Mill went on to develop
and elaborate over the following chapters of On Liberty a far more intricate theory about the
protection of certain interests and legal rights—express and customary legal rights—in order to
advance his ethical vision of individualism, diversity, creativity, and human self-development,
grounded on a utilitarian approach. Mill’s fully articulated theory in On Liberty must be
distinguished from Mill’s early statement of a simple harm principle focused on the basic notion
of ‘harm to others.’
Second, then, the clarification: Liberal legal thinkers at the mid-twentieth century,
especially H.L.A. Hart, but others as well such as Joel Feinberg and Herbert Wechsler, drew on
Mill’s early statement of a simple ‘harm to others’ principle to develop the modern harm
1
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principle, which they deployed successfully in the debate with modern legal moralists, such as
Lord Devlin, over prostitution, homosexuality, and the legal enforcement of morals. As a result,
it is Hart’s modern harm principle, focused on the basic notion of ‘harm to others’ and ‘human
suffering,’ that triggered a proliferation of harm arguments and ultimately collapsed the modern
harm principle, not Mill’s fully articulated theory of protected interests and legal rights.
Although, as Anders Walker has shown, 4 there was already a turn back to the simple notion of
‘harm to others’ in the nineteenth century, it was only after the liberal legal thinkers at the midtwentieth century seized on the early ‘harm to others’ language from Mill’s introduction to On
Liberty that there would be a proliferation of non-trivial harm arguments across the political
spectrum, and ultimately the collapse of the modern ‘harm to others’ principle. As for Mill’s
fully articulated theory of legal rights associated with his Humboldtian vision of human selfdevelopment, that aspect of Mill’s essay has had relatively little influence on modern criminal
law and on contemporary debates over the legal enforcement of morality 5, and it is therefore
difficult to assess the continuing vitality of Mill’s elaborated theory in On Liberty.
With this distinction and clarification in mind, the argument of The Collapse of the Harm
Principle can be slightly restated and, I believe, continues to shed light on ongoing contemporary
debates over the legal regulation of morality: today, the hegemony of the modern harm principle
continues to generate a proliferation of non-trivial harm arguments on both sides of the debates,
and the competing claims of non-trivial harms have effectively neutralized the critical, limiting
function of the modern harm principle. The proliferation of harm arguments has given rise to a
cacophony of harms that can only give rise to what I would call ‘harm decisionism’—i.e.
political decisions about which harms are more compelling than others and crude, intuitive
utilitarian calculi about minimizing social harms. But on those matters, the modern harm
principle does not perform a limiting function. Once the modern harm principle has been
satisfied by a claim of non-trivial harm, the decision whether to legally enforce morality
becomes, in essence, a harm free-for-all in which the victor is usually the one who makes the
most compelling and popular claim of injury—which, paradoxically, may lead precisely to the
kind of demagoguery and mass appeals that Mill tried to rein in with his elaborate theory of
interests and legal rights in On Liberty.
In this article, I demonstrate the continued vitality of the collapse of the modern harm
principle argument by exploring the recent United States Supreme Court decision on same-sex
marriage—a context involving a civil, not a criminal prohibition on behavior that is viewed by
some as immoral. United States v. Windsor 6 involved a challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage for purposes of
federal law as the union between a man and woman—thereby excluding legal same-sex
marriages conducted in States that allow such marriages from the federal definitions of
4
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‘marriage’ and ‘spouse.’ Insofar as DOMA enacts a moral objection to same-sex marriage,
DOMA should be conceived here as a federal legal prohibition on same-sex marriage, in other
words as the legal enforcement of morals.
From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor reflects perfectly the
collapse of the modern harm principle. Notice, first, that DOMA was enacted because of a
conservative harm argument about the potential injuries that same-sex marriages may cause to
traditional marriage and the family. DOMA itself reflects the proliferation of harm arguments
and the turn to harm by social conservatives. The statute, after all, was called the defense of
marriage act: Congress (and President Bill Clinton) were defending traditional marriage from the
potential harm that same-sex unions could have on heterosexual marriage and on the traditional
family. The legislative history from the House of Representatives reflects this well and
explicitly: the House Report states that ‘it is both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do
what it can to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage.... H.R. 3396 is
appropriately entitled the “Defense of Marriage Act.” The effort to redefine “marriage” to extend
to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of
marriage.’ 7 Justice Samuel Alito, in his dissenting opinion in Windsor, gives voice to what he
clearly considers to be potential non-trivial harms: ‘The family is an ancient and universal human
institution,’ Alito writes in Windsor. 8 ‘Family structure reflects the characteristics of a
civilization, and changes in family structure and in the popular understanding of marriage and
the family can have profound effects.’ These changes, Alito emphasized, can have ‘far-reaching
consequences.’ Alito warns: ‘We can expect something similar to take place if same-sex
marriage becomes widely accepted. The long-term consequences of this change are not now
known and are unlikely to be ascertainable for some time to come.’ Alito added in a footnote that
‘As sociologists have documented, it sometimes takes decades to document the effects of social
changes—like the sharp rise in divorce rates following the advent of no-fault divorce—on
children and society,’ and Alito cited a study about the ‘Unexpected Legacy of Divorce.’ Alito is
clearly referencing potential non-trivial harms: harms to children and society potentially
equivalent to those (purported real harms) associated with no-fault divorce.
Second, these potential harms of same-sex marriage satisfy, and thereby neutralize the
modern harm principle. Let me spell this out step-by-step: the conservative moral position, in
this context, is that same-sex marriage is morally wrong. On this basis, a legal moralist would
argue that there should be a prohibition on same-sex marriage—or, in other words, that DOMA
should be upheld since it represents a prohibition on immoral conduct. The modern harm
principle would state that same-sex marriage can only be prohibited—i.e. DOMA should only be
upheld—if same-sex marriage causes ‘harm to others.’ Inversely, the modern harm principle
would disallow DOMA if same-sex marriage causes no ‘harm to others.’ But given that the
legislation is based on a claim of non-trivial harm, the modern harm principle cannot function
here as a limiting principle to strike down DOMA. The modern harm principle cannot limit the
prohibition on same-sex marriage—it cannot strike down DOMA—precisely because the
traditionalists have turned to harm as well. And what is fascinating about the Supreme Court
7
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liberal majority in Windsor is that not a single justice takes the position that same-sex marriage
causes no potential harm to others. Faced with the conservative harm argument, all of the
justices defer to the political process on the question whether same-sex marriage causes harm to
others. No one on the Court is prepared to say that Section 3 of DOMA should be struck down
because same-sex marriage does not cause harm to traditional marriage or the family, and that
morals enforcement does not satisfy reasonable basis review (as the Court announced in
Lawrence). As a result, the modern harm principle has been neutered by the proliferation of
conservative harm arguments.
Third, rather than argue that same-sex marriage causes no harm, the liberal thinkers on
the Supreme Court ratchet up the harm, and outdo the conservative harm arguments: they double
the harm, by claiming an even greater harm. That greater harm, according to the liberal thinkers
on the Court, is the injury that Congress (and President Clinton) inflicted on same-sex couples by
enacting DOMA. Just as H.L.A. Hart would argue that the prohibition on homosexual sodomy
does greater harm than the harm of sodomy itself, just as the drug legalization lobby would argue
that the War on Drugs does more harm than drug use, the liberals on the Court pile on more harm
arguments: ‘the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law,’ Justice Kennedy writes
for the majority, ‘are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.’ 9 DOMA,
Kennedy writes, ‘brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples. It raises the cost of
health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their workers’ samesex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and
parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.’ 10 The opinion is all about harms. In
his usual way, Justice Scalia, in dissent, offers a succinct restatement of the liberal majority’s
harm arguments: ‘the majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with malice—with the
“purpose” “to disparage and to injure” same-sex couples. It says that the motivation for DOMA
was to “demean;” to “impose inequality;” to “impose ... a stigma;” to deny people “equal
dignity;” to brand gay people as “unworthy;” and to “humiliat[e]” their children (emphasis
added).’ 11 In effect, the liberal response to the conservative harm arguments is to double the
harm and to ratchet things up—which, incidentally, succeeds.
Fourth, what we are left with in Windsor is a rather typical harm free-for-all: a cacophony
of harm claims that the modern harm principle—which is intended to be a limiting principle—
cannot resolve. As a limiting principle, the harm principle cannot adjudicate between these
competing non-trivial harm arguments. Instead, we are forced to resort to ‘harm decisionism’:
we have to decide which harm is more important to us and then act accordingly. That is precisely
what happened at the Supreme Court. Now, to be sure, the Supreme Court did not apply the harm
principle: this was constitutional adjudication and the legal question was whether DOMA’s
Section 3 violates equal protection or due process under the U.S. Constitution. But the majority
in effect did take sides in the harm competition: Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority does
ultimately hold that it is the harm to same-sex couples that violates equal protection: ‘The
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Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group.’
Now, you might respond that the harm principle prevailed in Windsor either (1) because
the majority prohibited morals legislation on the ground that DOMA itself caused ‘harm to
others,’ or (2) because the Supreme Court was focused on the issue of harm—perhaps net harm
or overall harm—and that, basically, is what the harm principle is all about, i.e. about avoiding
overall net harm. But neither of those responses are consistent with the modern harm principle.
The first response turns the modern harm principle on its head and completely inverts the
logic: the majority did not address the harm of the underlying behavior, rather the harm of the
morals legislation. But of course morals legislation is going to cause harm. It is intended to cause
harm. It is intended to prohibit certain behaviors that are deemed, and in the process labeled or
stigmatized, as immoral. All morals legislation is going to cause that kind of harm. The
criminalization of incest or bestiality causes harm by punishing persons who engage in that
behavior and labeling them as immoral. What the modern harm principle is all about is avoiding
that kind of harm if the underlying conduct does not cause harm to others. The harm principle is
premised on the assumption that legal enforcement causes harm. But that secondary harm is
simply not a problem for the harm principle once it is established that the underlying conduct
causes ‘harm to others.’ For instance, prohibiting polygamy causes harm to polygamists and
labels them as criminal and immoral. In fact, it is intended to do them harm and disrupt their
families, send them to prison and punish them. But the harm principle is silent about all of that
secondary harm, so long as the principle is satisfied, i.e. so long as it is the case that polygamy
causes harm to others. The first response simply fails to appreciate that all regulation,
criminalization, punishment, and legal enforcement of morality causes harm to the targets of
enforcement, and therefore that there will always be an argument to strike down prohibitions
because they cause harm. But it is not an application of the harm principle to strike down morals
legislation because the legislation causes harm—that is assumed; it is only the job of the harm
principle to strike down morals legislation if the underlying conduct does not cause harm to
others. The first response, in other words, is all inside out: it incorrectly takes the premise as the
principle.
The second response—namely that the harm principle continues to do work at the level of
overall, net harm—completely misconstrues the modern harm principle: the harm principle is a
limiting principle that is intended to shield behavior that does not harm others. It is not the
equivalent of the larger utilitarian principle that legislation should minimize social harm or
maximize social utility. Once there exists ‘harm to others,’ conduct is no longer shielded by the
harm principle and the harm principle does no more work. And once you have gotten past the
limiting effect of the harm principle, then any number of rules of decision could apply. To say
that overall net harm becomes the most important factor in deciding whether to legislate does not
mean that the harm principle has triumphed, it simply means that society has adopted a utilitarian
calculus focused on maximizing well-being. It is just plain utilitarianism. And it is not required
by, it does not implicate, and it is not even akin to the limiting harm principle. Society could, just
as easily or reasonably, adopt the harm principle and beyond that, a rule of thumb that young
5

people decide: in other words, if behavior causes harm to others (if it satisfies the harm
principle), it can be prohibited, but society decides whether to prohibit based on a survey of 17 to
19-year-olds. There could be any number of rules of decision whether to prohibit behavior once
the limiting harm principle has been satisfied and the behavior is deemed to cause harm to
others. To try to maximize happiness in society by minimizing the amount of social harm and
human suffering is orthogonal to the modern harm principle—which states only that conduct
should not be prohibited unless it causes ‘harm to others.’
In sum, the modern harm principle has prevailed over legal moralism, but its victory and
the resulting proliferation of prohibitionist harm arguments have sapped the modern harm
principle of any limiting function on the legal enforcement of morals. Let me begin, then, with
the first and important distinction between John Stuart Mill’s elaborate rights theory in On
Liberty and the modern harm principle.
I.

John Stuart Mill On Liberty (1859)
‘That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.’ 12

This simple sentence from John Stuart Mill’s ‘Introductory’ to On Liberty—pulled out of
context and denuded of Mill’s sophisticated philosophical treatment—became a foundational
reference of Anglo-American criminal law and helped shape the course of penal legislation,
enforcement, and theory during the twentieth century. Known as the ‘harm to others’ principle—
or ‘harm principle’ for short—Mill’s simple sentence emerged, in the hands of H. L. A. Hart,
Joel Feinberg, Herbert Wechsler, and other liberal legal thinkers at mid-century, as the critical
principle used to shield individuals from the legal enforcement of morals legislation—including,
most notably, penal laws against homosexual conduct, commercial sex, illicit drugs, and other
behaviors that came to be known as ‘moral vices’ for some and ‘victimless crimes’ for others.
‘Harm to others’ became, in the 1970s and 1980s, the defining criteria of liberal thinkers in the
debate over the proper scope of the criminal law and the legitimate reach of the State—as
evidenced, perhaps most notably, by the lead volume of Feinberg’s magisterial and influential
treatise on The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, titled ‘Harm to Others,’ published in 1984.
As Mill himself had recognized in his sophisticated analysis of the ‘harm to others’
language in later chapters of On Liberty, however, the simple notion of ‘harm to others’ was far
too crude a criterion to withstand the pressure of majority opinion—far too vulnerable to the
rhetorical ploys and charismatic interventions that shape mass public sentiment—which was
precisely what Mill was trying to rein in. The advent of liberal democracy in the nineteenth
century, Mill explained in framing On Liberty, had raised a new set of concerns, not only about
representation, but also about ‘social tyranny.’ 13 In the emerging liberal democracies, Mill wrote,
the problem was no longer, or not only to protect against ‘the acts of the public authorities,’ but
12
13
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also to guard against the tidal wave of public opinion that could so easily encroach on
individuality and self-development: ‘Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate
is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and
feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them…’ 14 Mill was rather
explicit in his criticism of public opinion, which, he observed, ‘now rules the world’ and reflects
‘the tendencies and instincts of the masses,’ which he expressly equated with ‘collective
mediocrity.’ 15
Mill was by no means opposed to liberal democracy, to majority rule, nor to the
extension of suffrage—in fact, he was an outspoken advocate of women’s suffrage and defended
universal suffrage 16—but he was deeply concerned about the potential impact of mass popular
opinion on individualism. He did not resist, but sought instead to mediate the emerging defects
of the more generalized suffrage by refining democratic theory. And he did so, in part, by
advocating leadership by the more enlightened few:
‘I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a
general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the
government of mediocrity from being mediocre government. No government by a
democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions,
qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity
except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best
times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and
instructed one or few. The initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come
from individuals; generally at first from some one individual.’ 17
From this perspective, evidently, the simple notion of ‘harm to others’ was a notion that
was particularly susceptible to mass appeal—precisely the kind of emotional and populist
rhetorical flourish that could be slapped on to any behavior and lead to improper government
intervention. Left to the devices of the masses, ‘harm to others’ could potentially result in the
most oppressive restrictions on individual self-development.
II.

On Liberty: From ‘Harm to Others’ to Legal Rights and Duties

On this ground, Mill would develop gradually, over the course of his essay On Liberty, a
far more refined principle to limit interference with individual liberty. At first, Mill would
qualify the ‘harm to others’ language by specifying that only those acts can be proscribed which
do harm to others ‘without justifiable cause.’ 18 At this initial stage, Mill would emphasize that
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the individual ‘must not make himself a nuisance to other people’ 19: he must ‘refrain[] from
molesting others in what concerns them, and merely act[] according to his own inclination and
judgment in things which concern himself…’ 20 Mill developed and elaborated a first distinction
between self-regarding and other-regarding acts—between ‘the part of a person’s life which
concerns only himself and that which concerns others.’ 21
But here too, Mill acknowledged that the plain distinction between self and otherregarding acts would not hold up, without more. ‘I fully admit,’ Mill conceded, ‘that the mischief
which a person does to himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their
interests, those nearly connected with him and, in a minor degree, society at large.’ 22 And when
self-regarding mischief has such effects on others, or on society at large, Mill declared, it must
be ‘taken out of the self-regarding class.’ 23 Mill went even further, arguing that the mere risk of
affecting others could render legitimate legal prohibition: ‘Whenever, in short, there is a definite
damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out
of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law.’ 24
Further elaboration and refinement of the distinction would lead Mill to focus on notions
of interests, rights, and duties: the simple ‘harm to others’ principle would have to be embedded
in a far more robust theoretical structure of legal rights and obligations. And so, in his later
statements of the limiting principle, Mill framed the notion of harm within a liberal structure of
recognized legal rights. Mill declared that individuals had a duty ‘to observe a certain line of
conduct toward the rest,’ and that society ‘is justified in enforcing [this duty] at all costs to those
who endeavor to withhold fulfillment.’ 25 The line of conduct in question was to be understood
through the lens of legal rights: namely, it consisted ‘first, in not injuring the interests of one
another, or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit
understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share
(to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the
society or its members from injury and molestation.’ 26
In framing the ‘harm to others’ principle through the lens of express and customary legal
rights, Mill drew on the foundations of liberal thought. The liberal strand in modern political
thought had woven together, from a very early date, the notions, on the one hand, of obstructing
the movement or interests of others with, on the other hand, the idea of legal rights. In the
Leviathan, Hobbes had defined liberty as the very ‘absence of Opposition,’ and opposition as
‘externall Impediments of motion.’ 27 More importantly, Hobbes characterized civil laws as
‘hedges’ intended to protect citizens from the harmful consequences of the actions of others. As
Hobbes explained, ‘the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind the People
19
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from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt
themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not to
stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way.’ 28 These hedges, Hobbes argued, ‘are a necessary
means of the safety and well being of Man in the present World.’ 29 Locke as well borrowed the
image of hedges to describe law, referring to laws as what ‘hedges us in . . . from Bogs and
Precipices.’ 30 He too defined liberty in terms of both legal rights and interference from others:
‘For Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others which cannot be, where there is
no Law.’ 31 These early liberal definitions reflected the close nexus between legal rights and the
potential harm of infringing conduct—or, more simply, the basic liberal liberty principle, namely
‘that people should be able to live their lives as they choose without interference from others so
long as they are not preventing others from doing the same.’ 32
Mill did not elaborate in On Liberty the exact contours of the express and customary legal
rights that would undergird the ‘harm to others’ principle; but he would provide enough
illustrations in the ‘Applications’ chapter of his famous essay to suggest an outline. A good
sense, then, can be gleaned from the following list of legitimate government prohibitions and
regulations:
1. It is legitimate to forbid and punish marriage between two consenting individuals if
they cannot establish that they have sufficient financial means to support a family,
because of the negative effect of overpopulation on the return to labor for ‘all who
live by the remuneration of their labor.’ 33 In Mill’s words, such laws prohibiting
marriage ‘are not objectionable as violations of liberty’ because they prohibit ‘a
mischievous act’ that is ‘an act injurious to others…’ 34
2. It is acceptable to forbid and punish idleness ‘in a person receiving support from the
public’ 35 or if, as a result of that idleness, an individual fails to support their children
or otherwise fails to perform their legal duties to others. 36
3. It is proper to impose ‘a moderate fine’ on a father if his child is unable to read at a
public examination, because it is a duty of a parent to ensure that their child be able
‘to perform his part well in life toward others and toward himself.’ 37 To fail to do so
is ‘a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society.’ 38 As
Mill explained, the way to enforce his vision of education was through ‘public
28
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examinations, extending to all children and beginning at an early age;’ and if the
examination revealed that the child was not able to read, ‘the father, unless he has
some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be
worked out, if necessary, by his labor, and the child might be put to school at his
expense.’ 39
4. It is legitimate to prohibit and punish drunkenness for any individual ‘who had once
been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink’ or who
has a propensity or risk of violence to others while drunk, because ‘The making
himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime
against others.’ 40
5. It is appropriate to mandate and use the criminal sanction to enforce a mandate that a
seller of a substance that is poisonous label the substance ‘with some word expressive
of its dangerous character…’; or to require that a seller of ‘articles adapted to be
instruments of crime,’ such as firearms presumably, ‘to enter in a register the exact
time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and
quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he
received.’ 41
6. It is legitimate for the State to impose restrictions on ‘dealers in strong drinks’ to
make sure that they do not promote ‘intemperance;’ 42 also, to tax stimulants, such as
alcohol, ‘up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing
that the State needs all the revenue which it yields)’ and to regulate the sale of such
commodities by means of licensing, hours regulation, and ‘to withdraw the license if
breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of
the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing
offenses against the law.’ 43
7. It is legitimate to prohibit and punish acts that are ‘a violation of good manners,’ such
as ‘offenses against decency,’ if they are done in public, because when they are done
publicly they are ‘offenses against others.’ 44
Evidently, Mill justified a large number of regulations and penal prohibitions on the basis
of his rights framework. The theoretical structure, in Mill’s own hands, produced a blueprint for
a highly regulated society: a society that restricted procreation and regulated education,
prohibited public intoxication and indecency, regimented the sale of firearms and other potential
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instruments of crime, taxed the sale of alcohol and regulated its consumption. The risk of future
injury to protected interests or legal rights justified all forms of intervention. 45
Many theorists have observed this apparent paradox in Mill’s writings—the curious
juxtaposition of a liberty principle with so many intrusions into the family and private,
consensual behavior. 46 Some have attributed it to a deeper contradiction in early liberal thought.
Sheldon Wolin, for instance, in Politics and Vision, traces the apparent paradox in Mill’s work
back to Hobbes and an early liberal failure ‘to grasp the interconnections between social and
political forces’—to grasp, in effect, ‘the extent to which political practices were shaped by
social relationships.’ 47 Early liberal thought, Wolin argues, focused on the purely political—
namely, on questions of authority and superintendence of rulers, of obligations and duties of
citizens, and of the proper system of rules governing behavior—at the expense of the social
realm. The development of liberal thought during the next three centuries, Wolin suggests,
involved the gradual erosion of this distinctively political realm, and the rediscovery of society.
But the vision of the social realm which was gradually reintroduced into liberal thought was
overly idealized—even among those, such as Mill, who had a critical eye for the ‘mediocrity’ of
the masses and of public opinion.
Even in someone like Mill, Wolin contends, this produced a certain ‘blindness to social
coercions.’ 48 Although Mill, more than others, resisted the oppression of public opinion and
conformity, Wolin argues, Mill nevertheless fell back on the power of society to regulate human
conduct. ‘The same Mill who had accused Comte of aiming at “a despotism of society over the
individual,” who had welcomed de Tocqueville’s profound analysis of social conformity,’ Wolin
emphasizes, ‘nevertheless proposed that the tyranny of opinion be invoked in order to promote
some of his own pet causes’—the problem of overpopulation, the policy of open balloting, and
the benefits of communal ownership. 49 Even Mill, who was more vigilant than most in this
respect, nevertheless succumbed to this liberal blindness: ‘Mill failed to understand fully the
threat of social conformity.’ 50 As Wolin explains:
‘In retrospect the long journey from private judgment to social conformity appears as the
desperate effort of liberals to fashion a substitute for the sense of community that had
been lost. For what liberalism had thought it had solved, it had only exposed as a
problem.... They had conceived the issue as one of reconciling freedom and authority,
and they solved it by destroying authority in the name of liberty and replacing it by
society, but only at the cost of exposing freedom to society’s controls. To the nineteenth
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and twentieth centuries fell the task of stating the problem more correctly: not freedom
versus authority, or Man against the State, but authority and community.’ 51
In order to make sense of this apparent paradox in Mill’s writings, though, I think it is
important to recognize that Mill’s entire theoretical intervention was aimed at enhancing a
particular vision of human self-development. It was directed toward a goal of individual growth
and self-development—as commentators have noted. 52 For Mill, the notions of protected
interests and legal rights were inextricably linked to the virtues of individualism and individual
growth reflected in the maxims of Wilhelm von Humboldt, which Mill quoted extensively and
with great praise in the body of his essay: ‘the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the
eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the
highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.’53
This is the idea that Mill would enshrine as the very epigraph to On Liberty—again, citing
Humboldt: ‘The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages
directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest
diversity.’ 54
This is by no means a new insight, but it does serve to make sense of the apparent tension
in Mill’s thought. The scholarship on Mill’s moral and political philosophy has certainly
emphasized the centrality of self-development. As Alan Ryan suggests, ‘Mill’s concern with
self-development and moral progress is a strand in his philosophy to which almost everything
else is subordinate.’ 55 In Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy
of John Stuart Mill, John Berger refers to the doctrine of self-development as ‘the most important
and distinctive feature of [Mill’s] work.’ 56 Berger claims that, ‘[i]n writing about On Liberty, it is
clear that [Mill] viewed the essay as asserting (what I regard as) a powerful, somewhat
innovative, positive doctrine . . . of the importance to human well-being of individual selfdevelopment, or, as I prefer to call it, autonomy.’ 57 Focusing on Mill’s complex views of the
good, Wendy Donner reaches a similar conclusion in The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral
and Political Philosophy. Donner writes that ‘Mill’s most fundamental commitment, the driving
force of all his thought and writing, is the promotion of human self-development and the
happiness involved in the development and exercise of our higher human faculties’ and refers to
this as ‘the positive defense of the right to liberty of self-development....’ 58 The connection
between this overarching objective—well recognized—and the specific outcomes of Mill’s
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analysis in his ‘Applications’ chapter, though, is precisely what can make sense of the structure
of protected interests and legal rights that Mill had in mind.
The notion of legal rights embodied in Mill’s more elaborated restatements of the
limiting principle rested on a utilitarian calculus intended to maximize the diversity, creativity,
and self-development of individuals. 59 Mill emphasized: ‘I forego any advantage which could be
derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard
utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.’ 60 The utilitarian element
would infuse not only the definition of legal rights, but also the method of assessing, after a
violation of right is identified, whether the criminal sanction was appropriate. 61 And Mill did not
believe that the numerous regulations that he justified would infringe on the self-development of
humankind, because, in Mill’s opinion, the regulations promoted the interests of a more noble
and artistic self. 62 Restrictions on activities like drinking did not present a threat to human selfdevelopment, but rather promoted a healthier and more noble individual and society. 63
In the end, Mill substituted for the ‘harm to others’ principle a far more intricate liberty
principle that depended on a robust definition of express and customary legal rights constructed
in order to promote the ideal of individual self-development in its richest diversity.
‘Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own
rights, Mill argued, ‘these are fit objects of moral reprobation and, in grave cases, of moral
retribution and punishment.’ 64 In his final articulation of the ‘two maxims which together form
the entire doctrine of this essay,’ Mill made clear that he had developed an elaborated theory of
legal interests and rights:
‘The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions in
so far as these concern interests of no person but himself…. Secondly, that for such
actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and may
be subjected either to social or to legal punishment if society is of opinion that the one or
the other is requisite for its protection.’ 65
Mill himself was not particularly focused on or vested in the implications for the criminal
law, and had far greater ambitions than penal reform. His was a political and moral philosophy
aimed at a larger contribution to democratic theory and governance. To be sure, Mill’s essay On
Liberty would immediately engage and provoke jurists, especially the British barrister and judge,
Lord James Fitzjames Stephen. In 1873, in a book entitled Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Stephen
would publish a scathing attack on Mill’s essay and strenuously advocate legal moralism as a
59
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principle to justify government enforcement of morals legislation. 66 Stephen described his
argument as ‘absolutely inconsistent with and contradictory to Mr. Mill’s,’ 67 and his argument
was best captured in a now-famous passage: ‘[T]here are acts of wickedness so gross and
outrageous that, self-protection apart, they must be prevented as far as possible at any cost to the
offender, and punished, if they occur, with exemplary severity.’ 68 But Mill’s ambition was far
greater than to intervene simply in the criminal law. It was to develop a more encompassing
utilitarian framework to advance a conception of individuality, of creativity, of diversity, and of
individual differentiation and self-development—in Mill’s words, ‘to see that it is good there
should be differences.’ 69
III.

The Modern Harm Principle: The Road Back to the Simple Notion of Harm

Although Mill fully recognized that the simple notion of ‘harm to others’ would not
withstand scrutiny, nor the test of time, a century later the debate would focus on that very issue
of ‘harm to others’ and—as Mill would have predicted—the early, simplified ‘harm to others’
principle would collapse under the weight of its own success. It collapsed over the course of the
second half of the twentieth century, as more and more participants in the debate over the legal
enforcement of morals legislation, on both sides of the debate, would turn to harm-based
arguments in order to persuade public opinion—what Mill feared. After a momentary triumph of
the simple ‘harm to others’ principle, primarily due to its simplicity, the gradual proliferation and
accumulation of social harm arguments, without a limiting principle to adjudicate between
claims of harm, would ultimately render the modern harm principle useless—or worse, a mere
rhetorical ploy.
The problem, it seems, originated with H. L. A Hart, who would almost single-handedly
focus the debate back onto the simple notion of ‘harm to others.’ Hart’s intervention was sparked
by a series of events in England and the United States: in England, the Committee on
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (the ‘Wolfenden Report’) had recommended that private
homosexual acts between consenting adults no longer be criminalized and discussed at length the
privacy interests in consensual commercial sex but the problems associated with public
solicitation and street prostitution; in the United States, the Supreme Court was struggling over
the definition and treatment of obscenity, and the American Law Institute was drafting a Model
Penal Code and rethinking the criminalization of ‘vice crimes.’ 70 In both countries, liberal
thinkers believed that legal moralism, along the lines of Stephen’s arguments in Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity, was experiencing a rejuvenation and threatening to encroach on liberal
ideals. More than anyone else, Lord Patrick Devlin catalyzed this perceived threat. In his
Maccabaean Lecture, delivered to the British Academy in 1959, Devlin argued that purportedly
immoral activities, like homosexuality and prostitution, should remain criminal offenses. 71
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Devlin published his lecture and other essays under the title The Enforcement of Morals and soon
became associated with a renewed principle of legal moralism—namely, that moral offenses
should be regulated because they are immoral, regardless of whether they infringe on legitimate
interests in the Millian sense.
In Law, Liberty, and Morality, a set of lectures delivered at Stanford University in 1962
in response to Devlin, Hart squarely addressed the debate over the enforcement of morals: ‘the
subject of these lectures,’ Hart declared, ‘concerns the legal enforcement of morality and has
been formulated in many different ways: Is the fact that certain conduct is by common standards
immoral sufficient to justify making that conduct punishable by law? Is it morally permissible to
enforce morality as such? Ought immorality as such to be a crime?’72 And right after posing the
subject his lectures, Hart immediately cited Mill, but refocused the entire debate on the narrow
question of harm to others:
‘To this question John Stuart Mill gave an emphatic negative answer in his essay On
Liberty one hundred years ago, and the famous sentence in which he frames this answer
expresses the central doctrine of his essay. He said, “The only purpose for which power
can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is
to prevent harm to others.’’’ 73
Hart rehearsed and embraced Mill’s limiting principle, but carefully and deliberately
pared the argument down to its original, simple, succinct, and crude statement regarding ‘harm.’
Notice the emphasis on that single ‘famous sentence,’ reproduced in full, alone, without further
development: the core of Mill’s doctrine, Hart maintained, was the notion of ‘harm to others.’
Hart did not refer his listeners to the later elaborations of the limiting principle, which Mill
himself had referred to as ‘the entire doctrine of this essay.’ 74 Hart referenced only the first crude
articulation.
In this and subsequent passages, Hart would reduce Mill’s argument to the ‘harm to
others’ language. Hart endorsed the simple harm argument, and declared that, ‘on the narrower
issue relevant to the enforcement of morality Mill seems to me to be right.’ 75 Throughout his
lectures, Hart would constantly and repeatedly oppose the notion of ‘immorality’—the basis of
the legal moralist argument—to the fact that the underlying conduct is ‘not harmful to others’ or
involves no ‘suffering.’ 76 Hart reduced the complexity of Mill’s essay, reiterating, throughout,
72
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‘Mill’s own principle that coercion may be justifiably used to prevent harm to others.’ 77 Hart’s
focus was narrowly on harm—which would, predictably, undermine the very principle
advanced. 78
In a somewhat similar way, the liberal philosopher Joel Feinberg, in an essay entitled
Moral Enforcement and the Harm Principle published in 1973, would embrace Mill’s argument,
but he too would pare the limiting principle down to its original, simplified formulation focused
on harm to others. 79 Feinberg distinguished between direct and indirect harm, but did not go
much further, at the time, in developing the notion of harm at the heart of the limiting principle. 80
Feinberg endorsed the simple harm principle and wrote that the distinction, ‘as Mill intended it to
be understood, does seem at least roughly serviceable, and unlikely to invite massive social
interference in private affairs.’ 81 Feinberg published the first volume of The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law, tellingly called Harm to Others, eleven years later in 1984. Feinberg analyzed and
elaborated on the harm principle, developing fifteen supplementary criteria which he called
‘mediating maxims’ to assist in the application of the ‘harm to others’ principle. 82 But even by
the end of his four-volume treatise, Feinberg had remained wedded to the basic harm principle,
concluding his treatise with the following definition of liberalism: ‘we can define liberalism
cautiously as the view that as a class, harm and offense prevention are far and away the best
reasons that can be produced in support of criminal prohibitions, and the only ones that
frequently outweigh the case for liberty.’ 83 The original, simplified harm principle—focused on
harm to others—remained, even by the end of Feinberg’s treatment, one of the two main limits
on state regulation of moral offenses.
IV.

The Rise and Fall, and the Eventual Collapse of the Simple Harm Principle

In an article titled ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle,’ 84 I traced a history of the harm
principle, demonstrating how the return to a crude notion of ‘harm to others’ in the work of Hart,
Feinberg, and other liberal theorists originally succeeded, at least at a rhetorical level, in
defeating the renewed legal moralist arguments at mid-century; how the simple harm principle
then became dominant in Anglo-American criminal law and theory; how moral prohibitionists
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then turned to harm arguments in order to support their legal moralist positions; and how, as a
consequence, the simple harm principle collapsed under the weight of its own success and
eventually no longer provided a limiting principle to the exercise of the government’s power to
punish. Rather than repeat the argument here, I will simply summarize its four steps with some
slight revisions.
1. Triumph: Over the period 1960-1980, Hart’s restatement of the simple ‘harm to
others’ principle (which I will henceforth refer to as ‘the modern harm principle’)
began to dominate the legal philosophic debate over the enforcement of morality.
Most prominent theorists who participated in the debate either relied on the modern
harm principle or made favorable reference to the argument. 85 As Robert George,
who many might characterize as a legal moralist, acknowledged, ‘many . . . perhaps
even most [commentators] think that Hart carried the day . . . .’ 86 Jeffrie Murphy, who
is today a skeptic of the harm principle, captured well the prevailing consensus at the
time: ‘I believed, along with most of the people with whom I talked about legal
philosophy,’ Murphy wrote, ‘that legal moralism had been properly killed off, that
liberalism had once again been vindicated against the forces of superstition and
oppression, and that legal philosophy could now move on to new and more important
topics.’ 87
2. Hegemony: As the modern harm principle began to dominate the legal philosophic
debate, most of the leading criminal law scholars either adopted the modern harm
principle or incorporated it in their writings. 88 This was reflected most clearly in the
drafting of the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute, which was begun in
1952 and completed in 1962. Herbert Wechsler, the chief reporter and intellectual
father of the Model Penal Code, strongly endorsed harm as the guiding principle of
criminal liability: conduct, Wechsler wrote, ‘is not deemed to be a proper subject of a
penal prohibition’ unless it ‘unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens
substantial harm . . . .’89 This was, Wechsler emphasized, ‘a declaration designed to
be given weight in the interpretation of the [Model Penal] Code.’ 90 As a result,
throughout the Model Code and the Comments, the statutory language and discussion
reflected this emphasis on the modern harm principle 91—as did the substantially
similar provisions regarding the harm principle enacted in Alabama, Alaska,
85
See, e.g., Dworkin (1966) 996; L Henkin, ‘Morals and The Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,’ 63 Columbia
Law Review 391 (1963) 413.
86
R P George, ‘Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-Devlin
Debate,’ 35 American Journal of Jurisprudence 15 (1990) 30.
87
J G Murphy, ‘Legal Moralism and Liberalism,’ 37 Arizona Law Review 73 (1995) 74-75.
88
See, e.g., H Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 267 and 296; M Paulsen and S H Kadish,
Criminal Law and Its Processes (1st edition 1962) 1-17; R Perkins and R Boyce, Criminal Law (1982) 12; P
Robinson, Criminal Law (1997) 131.
89
H Wechsler, ‘Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code,’ 68 Columbia L. Rev.
1425 (1968) 1432.
90
Ibid.
91
See, e.g., MPCC 1985:1.02(1)(a) and MPCOD 1985:Note 14; MPCOD 1985:16; MPCOD 1985:17; MPCOD
1985:196; MPCOD 1985:458; MPCOD 1985:369; MPCOD 1985:482; MPCOD 1985:190.

17

Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington, among other states.
3. Proliferation: The rise of the modern harm principle in criminal law gave way, in the
1980s and 1990s to a proliferation of harm arguments across the political spectrum,
especially at first among those advocating for prohibition. Armed with social science
studies, with empirical data and with anecdotal evidence, the proponents of regulation
and enforcement shed the 1960s rhetoric of legal moralism and adopted, instead,
harm arguments: Catharine MacKinnon focused on the multiple harms to women and
women’s sexuality caused by pornography; the proponents of the ‘broken windows
theory’ emphasized how minor disorder, like prostitution and loitering, cause major
crimes, neighborhood decline, and urban decay; the harm associated with the spread
of AIDS was used to justify increased regulation of sexual conduct; a new
temperance movement in Chicago and the quality-of-life initiative in New York City
focused on the harmful effect of liquor establishments and public drunks on
neighborhoods and property values; the debate over the legalization of drugs focused
on the harms caused by drug use. There emerged what can only be described as a
proliferation of prohibitionist harm arguments aimed at satisfying the modern harm
principle. To be sure, as Anders Walker correctly points out, the proliferation of harm
arguments was not entirely new; 92 ‘reformers like Anthony Comstock,’ Walker points
out, ‘began to enlist harm arguments in the regulation of illicit sex as early as 1872,
not long after Mill finished On Liberty. 93 And so, for example, ‘Among the physical
effects that Comstock focused on was pornography’s tendency to encourage the “fatal
habit of masturbation,” a physical and psychological “debility.”’ 94 But the
proliferation in the late twentieth century was so uniquely extensive and wide-ranging
that it would have an impact on the stability of the modern harm principle.
4. Collapse: The proliferation of harm arguments, on both sides of the debates—not just
over prostitution and homosexuality, but also over alcohol and drug consumption,
loitering, gambling, pornography, and adultery—has effectively collapsed the simple
harm principle. ‘Harm to others’ is no longer today a limiting principle because it, by
itself, no longer excludes categories of moral vice from the scope of the law. It no
longer discriminates because there are so many non-trivial harm arguments. Instead
of focusing on whether certain conduct causes harm, today the debates center on the
types of harm, the amounts of harm, comparisons of harms, and our willingness, as a
society, to bear the harms. And the harm principle is silent on those questions—silent
in the sense that it does not determine whether a non-trivial harm justifies restrictions
on liberty, nor does it determine how to compare or weigh competing claims of
harms. It does not address the comparative importance of harms.
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The Collapse of the Harm Principle documents in detail the proliferation of prohibitionist
harm arguments throughout different contemporary debates, ranging from pornography and
prostitution, to homosexuality and fornication, to drug use and alcohol consumption. 95 It shows
how liberal theorists responded by claiming even greater harm, and demonstrates how that cycle
ultimately collapsed the modern harm principle. The clearest example involves the case of illicit
drugs, where the arguments for and against prohibition have produced a kind of harm-ratchet that
has effectively neutered the harm principle. The liberal position in the 1960s and early 1970s was
characterized by the argument that marijuana use was essentially a ‘victimless’ crime—that it
caused no ‘harm to others.’ 96 That early progressive argument was countered in the late 1970s
and early 1980s by a campaign against drug use that emphasized the harms to society and
justified an all-out ‘War on Drugs.’ This prohibitionist turn to harm disarmed the traditional
liberal position, forcing the progressives to turn to arguments about ‘harm reduction’: The term
‘harm reduction,’ crafted in the early 1990s as an alternative to ‘legalization,’ was a direct
response to the conservative harm arguments, but at the same time a ratcheting of those harm
arguments. ‘Harm reduction,’ according to its leading proponent, is ‘a policy that seeks to reduce
the negative consequences of both drug use and drug prohibition, acknowledging that both are
likely to persist for the foreseeable future.’ 97 In response to that, the proponents of the ‘War on
Drugs’ argued even greater harm: ‘The so-called harm-reduction approach to drugs confuses
people with terminology. All drug policies claim to reduce harm. No reasonable person
advocates a position consciously designed to be harmful. The real question is which policies
actually decrease harm and increase good. The approach advocated by people who say they
favor ‘harm reduction’ would in fact harm Americans.’ 98 As a result, today, both prohibitionists
and legalizers make harm arguments. The debate is over which harms are worse. And on that
question, the modern harm principle is entirely silent.
V.

Recent Developments in the Area of Same-Sex Sexual Conduct and Marriage

Rather than continue further to refine the collapse of the modern harm principle
argument, it may be useful to focus on more recent developments in one specific area—namely
same-sex sexual conduct and marriage—to show the continuing vitality of the thesis. Recent
developments in this area demonstrate well that the proliferation of harm arguments is still going
strong and, once again, eviscerating the modern harm principle.
Mill himself did not address the prohibition on same-sex sexual conduct in On Liberty or
elsewhere—to the best of my knowledge—although commentators tend to marshal his writings
on liberty in support of deregulation and decriminalization—in favor of disenforcement.99
H.L.A. Hart, naturally, directly addressed the question in response to Devlin’s provocation, in
Law, Liberty, and Morality, and came down staunchly against prohibition, arguing both that the
claim that homosexuality causes social harm has no empirical foundation and that the prohibition
95
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itself inflicts unnecessary suffering on individuals. On the question of harm, Hart protested, ‘no
evidence is produced…. As a proposition of fact it is entitled to no more respect than the
Emperor Justinian’s statement that homosexuality was the cause of earthquakes.’ 100 Other liberal
theorists agreed with Hart and sounded the same refrain: as Ronald Dworkin suggested,
‘[Devlin] manages this conclusion without offering evidence that homosexuality presents any
danger at all to society’s existence....” 101 The tragic advent of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s,
however, changed things, and the threat of AIDS soon became the harm that justified increased
regulation; this became immediately apparent in the debate over the closing of gay bathhouses at
the time of the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic. 102
At the heart of the AIDS outbreak in 1986, the United States Supreme Court would adopt
a legal moralist position regarding homosexual sodomy, declaring in Bowers v. Hardwick that
moral sentiments against homosexuality provided a rational basis for enforcing Georgia’s
criminal ban. 103 Justice Byron White declared for the Court, in Hardwick, that the criminal law is
constantly, and may properly be, ‘based on notions of morality.’ 104 But twelve years later, with
the epidemic somewhat under control and changed social circumstances, the Supreme Court
would reverse course and, in Lawrence v. Texas, strike down Texas’s anti-sodomy law. 105 This
time it was Justice John Paul Stevens’s declaration, from his dissent in Hardwick, that governed:
“the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” 106
What is important for present purposes, though, is not how the Court ruled in Hardwick
or Lawrence, but rather that in both cases—as well as in the more recent controversy over samesex marriage—there are harm arguments advanced on both sides of the debates and that the
modern harm principle offers no guidance as to how to resolve the competing claims of harm.
This is most evident in the recent debates over same-sex marriage—decidedly not a criminal law
matter, but bearing the same relation to the government’s legitimate role in regulating—or
deregulating—moral norms surrounding the family.
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion regarding a challenge to Section 3 of DOMA is a
case on point, a decision in which battling claims of harm ultimately neutralize the effect of the
harm principle. As noted, the case, United States v. Windsor, involved a challenge to Section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), passed in 1996, which defined ‘marriage’ for purposes of
all federal legislation as ‘only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife,’ and the word ‘spouse’ as ‘a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.’ 107 By
means of this enforceable definition, Congress intended to deny to same-sex couples, lawfully
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married in states that permit same-sex marriage, any of the federal benefits or rights provided to
married couples under federal law. The Supreme Court ultimately held in Windsor that Congress
had overstepped its authority in defining ‘marriage’ and that the States should be the ones who
define marriage. The Court majority ruled on the grounds of due process and equal protection,
but what is clear from the dueling opinions is that the notion of harm was at the very heart of the
debate—and on both sides of the argument. There are dueling theories of harm at play.
Justice Samuel Alito, in his dissenting opinion, expressed the new, prohibitionist harm
arguments against same-sex marriage—or more appropriately, the risks of harm. ‘The family is
an ancient and universal human institution,’ Alito emphasized. ‘Family structure reflects the
characteristics of a civilization, and changes in family structure and in the popular understanding
of marriage and the family can have profound effects.’ These changes, Alito emphasized can
have ‘far-reaching consequences. But the process by which such consequences come about is
complex, involving the interaction of numerous factors, and tends to occur over an extended
period of time.’ Alito warned: ‘We can expect something similar to take place if same-sex
marriage becomes widely accepted. The long-term consequences of this change are not now
known and are unlikely to be ascertainable for some time to come.’ Alito added in a footnote that
‘As sociologists have documented, it sometimes takes decades to document the effects of social
changes—like the sharp rise in divorce rates following the advent of no-fault divorce—on
children and society,’ and cited a study about the ‘Unexpected Legacy of Divorce.’ 108 Alito
continued: ‘At present, no one—including social scientists, philosophers, and historians—can
predict with any certainty what the long-term ramifications of widespread acceptance of samesex marriage will be.’ Alito’s tone is ominous, and even though he is essentially arguing for
deference to the democratic process, the dice are somewhat loaded and the harm arguments are
clear.
On the other side of the debate, harm played an equally central role: Congress had
intended to harm same-sex couples, and the Court needed to protect them from that harm. As
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, ‘The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot”
justify disparate treatment of that group.’ 109 Justice Kennedy’s opinion stresses the harms of
DOMA to same-sex couples. DOMA, Kennedy wrote, ‘brings financial harm to children of
same-sex couples. It raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided
by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to
families upon the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are an integral part of family
security.’ The opinion is all about harms. ‘Under DOMA,’ Kennedy emphasized, ‘same-sex
married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible and public
ways.’ DOMA ‘prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining government healthcare
benefits they would otherwise receive;’ it ‘deprives them of the Bankruptcy Code’s special
protections for domestic-support obligations;’ ‘it forces them to follow a complicated procedure
to file their state and federal taxes jointly;’ and ‘It prohibits them from being buried together in
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veterans’ cemeteries.’ ‘For certain married couples,’ Kennedy went on, ‘DOMA’s unequal
effects are even more serious,’ depriving them of the federal protections against domestic
violence and other safeguards of federal criminal law. Kennedy’s opinion is steeped in harm:
‘What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to establish that the principal
purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful
same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution.’
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts tried to neutralize Kennedy’s harm arguments,
writing that there is ‘hardly enough’ evidence ‘to support a conclusion that the “principal
purpose” of the 342 Representatives and 85 Senators who voted for it, and the President who
signed it, was a bare desire to harm.’ 110 Roberts then himself turns the harm tables: ‘At least
without some more convincing evidence that the Act’s principal purpose was to codify malice,
and that it furthered no legitimate government interests, I would not tar the political branches
with the brush of bigotry.’ 111
Justice Scalia joined in as well, mitigating Kennedy’s harm arguments. The evidence of
other justifying rationales for DOMA—that is, besides intentionally wanting to harm same-sex
couples—‘give the lie to the Court’s conclusion that only those with hateful hearts could have
voted “aye” on this Act.’ As Scalia emphasized, ‘it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s
supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob when one first describes their views
as they see them.’ Scalia declared: ‘the majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with
malice—with the “purpose” “to disparage and to injure” same-sex couples. It says that the
motivation for DOMA was to “demean;” to “impose inequality;” to “impose ... a stigma;” to
deny people “equal dignity;” to brand gay people as “unworthy;” and to “humiliat[e]” their
children (emphasis added). I am sure these accusations are quite untrue.’ And then, in closing,
once again, Scalia raised the specter of polygamy—though not bestiality this time. ‘It is enough
to say that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve of same-sex
marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or
the consumption of alcohol.’ 112
The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the same-sex marriage position in the DOMA case,
giving voice to the harm that the DOMA inflicts on same-sex couples. The opinions are dressed
in constitutional discourse, but it is really harm that is at play. One can favor the result, or object
to it—that, I think, for present purposes, is irrelevant. What is relevant and telling is that the real
battle is between harms, that both sides of the debate are throwing around harm arguments, and
that the decision ultimately rests on who is more convincing on comparative harms, not whether
there is ‘harm to others.’ In that debate, the modern harm principle has no role. It is a debate that
is vulnerable to the greatest demagoguery, mass public appeal, and social pressure. It reverts the
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most important questions about the protection of the individual to the kind of rhetorical and
popular debates that Mill would have avoided at all cost. The problem, in effect, is that the
simple notion of ‘harm to others,’ as Mill had warned us, is not up to the task. By returning to
that simple notion of harm, the liberals first, but the legal moralists second, and then both in
ratcheted cycles, have essentially gutted the limiting principle that Mill began to develop. They
have functionally neutralized the modern harm principle as a critical limiting principle.
Conclusion
Liberal thinkers in the twentieth century sapped Mill’s limiting principle of its strength
by returning to ‘harm to others.’ What we are left with today is not a limiting harm principle, but
rather harm decisionism. And that, more than anything, opens the way precisely to the threat of
‘social tyranny’ 113 that Mill feared and tried to protect against. H.L.A. Hart was certainly right
when he wrote that ‘For Mill, these dangers were part of the price to be paid for all that is so
valuable in democratic government. He thought the price certainly worth paying; but he was
much concerned to remind the supporters of democracy of the danger and the need for
vigilance.’ 114 Mill tried to protect us from these dangers by elaborating on protected interests and
legal rights in furtherance of a vision of individual diversity, creativity, and self-development—
but his project was undermined by his own followers in the twentieth century. It is questionable
whether Mill’s unique approach would have had more success. It is not at all clear that Mill’s
notion of legal rights would offer greater determinacy than the notion of ‘harm to others.” In the
end, it is perhaps only ‘the need for vigilance,’ as Hart phrased it, that can best protect liberal
democracy.
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